We often hear about the “New World Order,” but with barely a reference or description of an “Old World Order.” Richard Haass speaks of “World Order 1.0” and “World Order 2.0.” World Order 1.0, he says, is the “traditional operating system” that has been built around the protection and prerogatives of state. He traces it back to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), when the concept of sovereignty – the right of nations to an independent existence and autonomy – began occupying the core of what international order there has been.

An approach to international order premised solely on respect for sovereignty, together with the balance of power necessary to secure it, is no longer sufficient. What goes on inside a country can no longer be considered the concern of that country alone.

World Order 2.0, Haass maintains, must include not only the rights of foreign states but also states’ obligations to others. He distinguishes between “sovereign obligation” and sovereignty as responsibility, which lies at the heart of the legal doctrine known as the “responsibility to protect,” or “R2P.” R2P refers to the obligations that government has to its own citizens – commitments that, if ignored, are supposedly enforceable by other states. Sovereign obligation, on the other hand, is about what a country owes to other countries. It stems from a need to expand and adapt the traditional principles of international order for a highly interconnected world.

Sovereign obligation retains a respect for borders and an opposition to their being changed through coercion or force. It supports actions to enforce norms against aggression. It retains a respect for governments’ right to act generally as they wish within their borders, subject to the constraints of broadly accepted provisions of international law. Sovereign obligation does not replace the traditional approach to order so much as it builds on it.

FROM STATEHOOD TO TERRORISM AND BOMBS
The new international order will require an expanded set of norms and arrangements, beginning with the commonly agreed-on basis for statehood. There cannot be an unlimited right for any and all communities to achieve political self-determination. Reaching a consensus on how to limit such a right will be necessary lest unilateral actions conflict. A good start would be to amend the concept of self-determination so that it is regarded as something that has to be not only asserted but also granted.

With such an approach, existing governments would have to agree to consider bids for statehood in cases where there was

- a historical justification
- a compelling rationale
- popular support, and
- viability
The impact of such a move on the viability of the country giving up territory and population would need to be considered as well, and governments would agree to consult with one another before making diplomatic moves.

Essential elements of World Order 2.0:
- prohibitions on carrying out or supporting terrorism
- bolstering the norm against the spread of use of WMD
  - What to do once proliferation has occurred. Preventive action to stop proliferation, including pre-emptive military action.

Other areas:
- **Climate change** (the quintessential manifestation of globalization)
- **Cyberspace.** The goal should be to create international arrangements that encourage benign uses of cyberspace and discourage malign uses. Parts:
  - maintaining a single integrated global cyber network,
  - limiting what a country could do to stop the free flow of information and communication within it,
  - prohibiting commercial espionage and theft of intellectual property, and
  - limiting and discouraging disruptive cyberspace activity during peacetime.
  - Exceptions: cyberattacks to frustrate proliferation and terrorism.
- Global health
- Refugees
- The economic realm, e.g., trade agreements..

**FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE**
Washington should mull what it would accept for itself and what it would require of others, working toward a generalized code of appropriate behavior. Any world order will constrain U.S. choices as well as the choices of others. Whenever it demands more of others than it does of itself, the U.S. appears hypocritical and forfeits authority and trust.

Military force may be required on occasion – but if force turns out to be necessary, any military operation will have to bear scrutiny of its justification and implementation.

The U.S. needs to accept special obligations in the economic realm, considering the views of others when deciding on interest rates or asset purchases ("quantitative easing"). Regular, serious consultations between the Fed and its central bank counterparts around the world are essential. Trade disputes should be taken to the WTO rather than acted on unilaterally. Promoting World Order 2.0 will require extensive consultations.

Progress on this agenda will need to come voluntarily, rather than as the result of some top-down edict. Governments will have to decide whether they are prepared to sacrifice some autonomy in return for improved collective action. Discussion and persuasion can drive change over the long term. The role of the U.S. Secretary of State and other officials need to
change for the perceivable future, with greater emphasis on consultations over the contours of the international order, and less on negotiations that solve explicit problems.

It’s premature to think of either the G-20 or the UN Security Council as a venue.